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stochastic disturbance terms, à la Bernanke-Sims. . . . . . . . . . . . 70




Choosing an exchange rate regime for a developing economy is a long debated
topic in international macroeconomics. Historically, a wide variety of alterna-
tive schemes were considered to be correct at different points in time. How-
ever, as a result of the 1990’s financial crises, a renewed interest emerged among
economists. As Fischer (2001) puts it, there is a clear bipolar wisdom between
those who advocate floating regimes, and those others that advise fixed exchange
rate arrangements.
The evidence shows that the output response to real shocks depends on the
degree of openness of the economy, as documented below. For foreign-currency
indebted countries, relatively open economies tend to be better insulated from
real shocks (in terms of output dynamics) when they are under a flexible exchange
rate regime. However, relatively closed economies are able to buffer the real shock
better if they are ruled by a fixed regime.
Thus, the core contribution of this manuscript focuses on explaining why the
choice of the exchange rate regime should be contingent on the degree of openness
of the economy and the degree of currency mismatch. Specifically, in response to
real shocks such as terms of trade, international interest rate or export demand
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shocks, some countries will be better served by fixed regimes, whereas some others
will be better off with flexible arrangements. Determining which exchange rate
to choose will depend on the share of non-tradable goods in aggregate output
and the ratio of the foreign-currency-denominated debt to total debt.
Given the above observed patterns, I build a Stochastic Dynamic General
Equilibrium (SDGE) model with nominal rigidities, financial frictions and foreign-
currency-denominated debt to explain these stylized facts. Using this framework,
the contributions of this manuscript are the following:
First, I show that the differentiated performance of alternative exchange rate
regimes stems from the output composition of domestic goods: the higher the
share of tradables in GDP (i.e., the higher the degree of openness of the economy),
the higher the likelihood that a flexible exchange rate regime will perform better
as a shock absorber. Conversely, the more closed to trade an economy is, the more
likely that a fixed regime will be the optimal choice. The intuition behind this
result is explained as follows. Entrepreneurs (borrowers) pay an external finance
premium that is increasing in their leverage. If a real devaluation results from a
negative real shock, the former generates a jump in the real value of debt: the
balance sheet effect. For producers of tradables, the expansionary effects of the
real devaluation compensate the contractionary balance sheet effect. However,
non-tradables are negatively affected in their balance sheets but lack a “rest
of the world” which they can re-direct the excess supply generated by the fall
in domestic demand. This reduces revenues – both prices and quantities fall –
and consequently reduces the ability of entrepreneurs to purchase the necessary
capital for future production. This also generates an intertemporal link, due to
the increased external finance premium that results from a higher leverage, which
2
reduces the ability to purchase capital in the future. Thus, some sectors of the
economy benefit with a flexible exchange rate, whereas some others would be
better served by a peg. Consequently, the selection of the exchange rate regime
hinges on the weight that each of these sectors has within the aggregate economy.
Second, I extend Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory for open economies. If
the ex-post real return to capital or the ex-post real devaluation ends up being
different than expected, the external finance premium that entrepreneurs pay
on loans increases in an nonlinear fashion. The greater the currency mismatch
is when the real price changes, the greater the increase in the premium that
entrepreneurs pay on their external borrowing. The intuition for this is easy to
grasp. For a lower net worth, the leverage increases and so reduces the chances
of entrepreneurs repaying their debts. Forward looking rational lenders will then
increase the premium charged on external borrowing so as to keep the expected
repayment equal to their opportunity cost of funds. Forward looking borrowers
will respond by reducing their current demand for capital, thus generating a
smaller capacity for next period. This generates another intertemporal link for
the propagation of the shock: all else equal, the reduction in demand for current
capital decreases the price of capital. In turn, this also reduces net worth in next
period because of the reduced ability to produce. Consequently, investment is
lowered, thus further increasing leverage and the external finance premium and
therefore raising the probability of bankruptcy. In this sense, small shocks to the
economy get amplified and propagate, thus generating economic fluctuations at
business cycles frequencies.1
1In Fisher (1933), the original problem was the output overreaction due to credit market
imperfections: given low interest rates, many unprofitable projects were carried on, displaying
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The above mentioned nonlinearity raises the question of whether it is always
welfare improving for an economy to pay for the cost of a negative shock at
the outset of the crises, or if it might be better to spread out its effect along
time, so as to smooth the business cycle – by dampening the multiplier effects
over time. This opens a discussion in the ”Short-Sharp” vs. ”Long-Mild” type
of crises dimension at the normative level that will be answered below. In this
respect, the third contribution is to show that the answer depends on the degree
of openness and degree of currency mismatch. Under some situations, it is more
costly for the economy to bear the burden of a shock on impact than to smooth
it out. However, the more open an economy is, the lower the costs of paying
for the shock on impact instead of spreading it over time. The intuition for this
parallels the benefits from smoothing in the presence of convex adjustment cost.
Whether to do bunching or smoothing of the “welfare” costs associated with the
response to a real shock will depend on the trade-offs generated by the ratio of
non-tradables to GDP and the currency composition of debt.
Lastly, in order to test this hypothesis at the empirical level, I perform a vector
autoregression analysis for a pooled panel data sample of 32 small open economies
(SOE’s) covering the time period 1980 to 2001. Given the exogeneity of terms of
trade fluctuations for SOE’s, I impose this restriction directly on the interaction of
high prices and therefore driving the economy to a level of investment above the natural rate.
Once the overoptimistic behavior revealed incorrect, so did the over-borrowing, so prices started
dropping.This increased the real value of firms’ debts while decreased their revenues and made
many of them to become insolvent and going bankrupt. Thus, due to the misperceived expected
profits, when the state of nature revealed itself, the necessary adjustment to return the economy
to its long run equilibrium is amplified.
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the endogenous variables in the structural form of the system of equations. This
procedure (usually labelled as near VAR) simplifies the identification strategy.
Furthermore, as a robustness check, in the appendix, the system is tested using
the Bernanke-Sims methodology; the results obtained almost replicate the ones
obtained in the near VAR approach.
Specifically, using an Impulse-Response analysis I document that results are
sensitive to the sample of countries considered. I split the sample according to
the degree of openness of the economy: for the set of relatively open economies,
I observe that flexible exchange rates are better real shock absorbers, as the
conventional wisdom suggests. But for relatively closed economies, I present
evidence that fixed regimes perform better in terms of insulating the economy
from a real shock. When focusing on the complete set of countries, I obtain results
similar in spirit to Broda (2000), which works as another robustness check.
The conclusion of this work is that when focusing on the determination of an
exchange rate for a small open economy mainly affected by real shocks, the de-
gree of openness of the economy plays an important role, especially when balance
sheet effects are present and nominal rigidities exist. The driving force operates
through the nonlinearity of the external finance premium response to unantic-
ipated changes in the real price of capital or unanticipated real devaluations.
The higher the leverage when unexpected real price change occurs, the larger
the observed increase in the external finance premium. Furthermore, and unlike
the conventional wisdom from Friedman (1953), small open economies will not
always benefit from a flexible exchange rate regime. Only to the extent that they
are sufficiently open will these economies be better off with flexible regimes. For
relatively closed economies, fixed regimes are better real shock absorbers.
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The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter (2) discusses how this pa-
per fits in the existing literature. Chapter (3) describes the general equilibrium
model, including nominal rigidities, currency mismatch and the balance sheet ef-
fect. Chapter (3), Section (3.2) shows the intrinsic nonlinear relationship between
unanticipated changes in real prices and the risk premium, as well as its effect on
the economy conditional on the degree of foreign currency indebtedness and the
degree of openness. Chapter (3), Section (3.3) analyzes the impulse response of
the economy to real shocks, controlling for the degree of openness of the economy,
and presents the main results of the paper. In Chapter (4.1) the model is tested





Conventional wisdom, which goes back at least to Meade (1951) and Friedman
(1953), states that in the presence of nominal rigidities, flexible exchange rates are
to be preferred in countries that are mostly exposed to real shocks. The rationale
for this argument is that the exchange rate will accommodate the required change
in relative prices that domestic prices are temporarily unable to do by themselves,
thus dampening real effects. On the contrary, in the presence of a fixed exchange
rate, the real side of the economy will bear the burden of the adjustment (e.g., a
recession in case of a negative terms of trade shock) so as to make relative prices
progressively and costly adapt to the new equilibrium.
Mundell (1960) extends this argument to analyze Optimal Currency Areas.
Small open economies affected by asymmetric real shocks should establish fixed
exchange rate regimes to reduce real exchange rate volatility. The latter, in turn,
reduces output volatility; in this sense, the higher the degree of openness, the
more responsive output is to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Poole (1970)
shows that for small open economies mainly affected by real shocks, flexible ex-
change rates outperform fixed regimes, whereas the opposite is true for economies
more exposed to nominal shocks.
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However, and especially since the Asian crisis of 1997, some writers have ar-
ticulated different views.1 At the time of the collapse, entrepreneurs in most
developing countries were under a currency mismatch: debts were in foreign cur-
rency – mainly in dollars, thus giving rise to the common terminology of liability
dollarization2– while sales were usually priced in domestic currency. This gives a
salient role to the balance sheet (or credit) channel: if the economy is unexpect-
edly “forced” into a real depreciation, the burden of debt will instantaneously
jump while revenues, at best, will remain constant in domestic currency. Con-
sequently, entrepreneurs’ net worth will be reduced, many firms will be unable
to repay their debts and will go bankrupt; and output will decrease because of
the decreased ability of firms to raise funds to finance the purchase of additional
capital.
In response to this, some models introduce balance sheet effects in a general
equilibrium setting with nominal rigidities (e.g. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco
(2001a, 2001b and 2001c), CCV henceforth, or Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci
(2001)), and claim that (Friedman’s) conventional wisdom is still valid. In these
models, the expansionary effects of the real depreciation offset the contractionary
balance sheet effects generated by the currency mismatch. This implies that floats
should be preferred to fixed regimes in order to absorb real shocks. Moreover,
CCV claim that although a possible theoretical construct, the balance sheet ef-
fect can not offset the expansionary effects of depreciations unless unrealistic
1See e.g. Krugman (1999) and Calvo (1999).
2Theoretical explanations of these patterns in terms of rational forward looking environments
have been put forward, among others, by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) and Jeanne
(2001).
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assumptions on parameter values are considered.3
At the empirical level the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Broda (2000),
Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2002) and Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001a and
2001b) present evidence consistent with flexible exchange rate regimes being bet-
ter than fixed regimes – in terms of output response – absorbing terms of trade
shocks. On the other hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2000 and 2002), Calvo, Izquierdo
and Talvi (2002), Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein (1999), Devereux
(2001), as well as Hausman, Panizza and Stein (2000), document that the output
effects of real shocks are larger in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes
when compared with countries that fix their exchange rate.4
As observed, then, the debate is still a theoretical as well as an empirical
open question. The documented evidence, as well as some of the existing models,
claim that there are some cases under which flexible exchange rates are better
absorbers of real shocks, whereas in other situations fixed regimes perform better.
This is precisely the point that this work addresses. It identifies characteristics
of SOE’s, such as the degree of openness and the degree of currency mismatch,
that strongly affect the output response of the economy to real shocks. In turn,
the choice of the exchange rate regime is contingent on these characteristics.
3In Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001) the argument is somewhat different. They intro-
duce a standard Taylor rule in which the domestic interest rate responds to changes in output,
inflation and prices and the expansionary channel emerges out of the decrease in the nominal
interest rate as a response to the real shock.
4Interestingly, Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein (1999) show that the response of
the economy to real shocks is nonlinear, in line with section (3.2) below.
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Chapter 3




The model belongs to the class of Dynamic New Keynesian models for open
economies. The set up is a standard consumers/workers general equilibrium
economy composed of tradable goods and non-tradable goods firms, with en-
trepreneurs and capital producers in both sector, and a rest of the world. The
Figure A.1 in the appendix displays the interconnection of the different agents in
the economy.
Wages are sticky and debt is denominated in foreign currency (dollars) in
the context of a small open economy (i.e. international prices are given). Cap-
ital purchased in period t is used to produce during period t + 1 after which it
depreciates in full.
Workers consume a CES composite of tradable and non-tradable goods. The
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former, in turn, is a CES composite of tradables produced either domestically
(home goods) or internationally (foreign goods). Consumers receive income from
working in the home goods (tradable) sector and in the non-tradable goods sector.
Workers demand the three goods such that the relative demand of each good
depends negatively on its relative price. Also, labor supply to each sector is
positively related to the real wage.
Firms produce in a competitive environment, maximizing profits subject to
their budget constraints. This results in standard demand functions for capital
and labor, in which marginal benefit equals marginal cost.
Capital producers, which for simplicity are assumed to be sector-specific, pur-
chase output from firms at the end of period t and sell capital that firms will use
to produce output during period t + 1 by way of a concave production function
to account for adjustment costs.
Entrepreneurs are the key players in this model. We assume that they are
the only type of individuals that can borrow and that they are able to do it only
in international markets; moreover, this borrowing is done in foreign currency.
Specifically, and following the literature initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and extended, among others, by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000), we as-
sume that entrepreneurs lack enough funds out of their after-consumption net
worth to purchase capital; furthermore, this constraint is always binding.1 Also,
this makes the endogenous external finance premium positively related to the en-
trepreneur’ s leverage and implies that for an entrepreneur to be able to increase
investment in a firm – given its net worth (i.e. increasing its leverage), expected
1See Mendoza (2001) for the case in which this constraint is endogenously not always binding
in the context of a small open economy.
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profitability of the project should compensate for the extra financial premium to
be paid. This mechanism is usually known as a financial accelerator.
Let’s summarize the model’s interactions among the different agents. In each
sector, capital producers, purchase output to produce capital that will be used
the following period. Entrepreneurs add their borrowing in the rest of the world
to their net worth to purchase capital from capital producers. This capital is
then rented to firms. In turn, the latter also hire workers. These workers, which
work for each sector earn a wage that is used for the consumption of the non-
traded good, the domestic traded good and the foreign good. Entrepreneurs,
for simplicity, are assumed to consume foreign goods only. The diagram in the
appendix reflects all the mentioned interactions.
In the context of this set up, the exercise consists in analyzing the economy’s
dynamics in response to real shocks under different exchange rate regimes and
to look for the benefits and costs of each monetary arrangement depending on
specific country characteristics such as the degree of openness (denoted by the
share of non-tradables in aggregate output) and the degree of currency mismatch
(reflected in the degree of foreign-currency-denominated debt).
3.1.2 Firms
In the domestic economy, a unit mass of home tradables (H) and a unit mass
of non-tradables (N) – or in general J = H,N – firms are perfectly competitive
within each sector and produce Y Jt units in period t using a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology in which factors of production are capital rented in period t (produced
during period t− 1), KJt−1, and labor hired in t, LJt :
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where AJt represents a technology shifter and α
J ∈ (0, 1) accounts for the share of
capital in output in sector J . It is worth noting that the aggregate capital stock
is pre-determined, since entrepreneurs that own capital – see below – decide in
period t − 1 how much capital to purchase in order to rent it during period t.
However, individual firms decide how much capital to hire during period t, but
they do not pre-commit to a capital stock at period t− 1. Instead, firms bid up
the rental price of capital so that the market for capital clears.
Labor within each sector is composed of a continuum of workers in the unit
interval, indexed by i, that are assumed to behave in a monopolistic competitive











where σ is the intratemporal elasticity of demand for worker i during period t in
sector J .
Firms optimization problem consists in maximizing profits subject to hiring

















for a rental rate of capital in sector J during period t equal to RJt , and paying a
wage rate equal to Wit to worker i during period t. The price index in sector J
2This assumption is explicitly introduced to generate nominal rigidities in the labor market.
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during period t is P Jt . Notice that the minimum cost of a unit of labor in sector








First order conditions are obtained by equalizing marginal benefit with marginal
cost and display demand for both factors of production that are negatively de-





















In equilibrium firms will make zero profits.
3.1.3 Consumers/Workers
We consider a small open economy where atomistic consumers (workers), indexed
by i ε [0, 1], consume non-tradables (N) and tradables (T). In turn, the latter are
either home produced (H) or produced in foreign countries (F). Also, consumers
supply labor to both domestic sectors, home and non-tradables. Specifically,
each worker consumes a basket of tradables and non-tradables given by a CES
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where Cit is the level of consumption of individual i in period t, C
T
it represents
consumption of tradables of individual i during period t, CNit is consumption of
non-tradables of individual i in t and ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between tradables and no-tradables.
Similarly, consumption of tradables in period t is also a CES aggregator of
Home goods, CHit , and Foreign goods, C
F














where ς denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign tradables.
Since each worker is infinitesimally small and all act alike, aggregation in equi-
librium becomes straightforward, so that subscript i can be obviated henceforth.
The consumption indexes imply that the minimum cost of purchasing these










1−ς + (1− φ)(P Ft )1−ς
] 1
1−ς (3.11)
where Pt corresponds to the aggregate economy’s price index in period t, P
T
t
reflects the price of tradables during t, PNt is the price on non-tradables, and P
H
t
and P Ft are the prices, during period t, of home and foreign goods, respectively.
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Assume that the law of one price holds along with free trade, thus implying
that the domestic price of home goods equals the foreign price of home goods
times the exchange rate, and that the domestic price of the foreign good equals




P Ft = StP
F∗
t (3.13)
where the nominal exchange rate in period t, defined as the domestic price of
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, is given by St, and an asterisk
denotes the international counterpart of any variable.






Moreover, we have already assumed that workers are monopolistically com-
petitive within each sector in the sense of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), thus allow-
ing for nominal rigidities in the labor market; the latter will come from wage
setting.3 Following the standard Dynamic New Keynesian literature, we assume
that workers can only adjust their wages randomly, according to the Calvo (1983)
mechanism. Each period, a fraction (1 − θ) of workers in sector J are able to
re-set their wages to W Jt ,
4 independently of the last time of adjustment, thus
implying that the expected time until a new adjustment is 1
1−θ . As a result, the
wage index in period t becomes,
3Results are qualitative similar if instead we impose price stickiness.
4Notice that since individuals behave symmetrically, every individual that adjusts her wage









3.1.4 Consumers Optimization Problem
Each consumer will solve a standard optimization problem by maximizing utility
with respect to a budget constraint. The instantaneous utility index for individual
























Individuals derive utility from consuming goods and disutility from supplying
labor to both sectors of domestic production. κ is a scale parameter. In an
































t − StB∗t−1(1 + ι) (3.18)
5The uncertainty refers to the international price of home goods, which is exogenous and, in
terms of the experiment below, will represent the shock to terms of trade, given that we have
assumed that PF∗t = 1 ∀t.
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in which consumption is made out of the income received by working in either
sector of the domestic economy. B∗t represents international assets hold by con-
sumers, the latter paying an interest rate equal to ι.




















































The intuition of these FOC’s is straightforward. (3.19) shows that the rela-
tive demand for tradables to non-tradables depends negatively on relative prices.
(3.20) implies that the relative demand for foreign goods to home goods is also
negatively related to relative prices. (3.21) and (3.22) display the labor supply
functions in the non-tradable and home goods sectors, respectively, both increas-
ing in the real wage paid in each sector.
3.1.5 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs in sector J consume (1 − δJ) of their net cash flow, which for
tractability is assumed to be entirely spent on imports. In each period, the share
18
of the cash flow that is not consumed is re-invested in purchasing the capital
that firms use to produce. We assume that the value of their net worth – cash
flow – in period t is not enough to purchase capital, driving them to borrow in
international credit markets.
The domestic currency value of the capital purchased during period t (that
will produce during period t + 1) equals QJt K
J
t , where Q
J
t is the price of capital
in sector J during period t. This will be financed by (the domestic value of) net
worth in period t for sector J , P Jt N
J
t , and by borrowing in international financial
markets an amount BJt in foreign currency, thus implying that the domestic










We assume entrepreneurs to be risk neutral. Therefore, they will demand
capital and borrow funds according to the expected rate of return on capital,
measured in terms of foreign currency. The latter will be the ratio between the
value of the expected return obtained from capital in period t + 1 (this comes
from (3.5)) to the original cost of purchasing that capital during period t, both













where we have assumed a depreciation rate of 100%.
However, risk neutral international financial markets perceive the existence
of some default risk on private lending. Given that depending on the state of
nature some loans will become non-performing, lenders optimally choose the debt
contract so as to account for the latter. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000)
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and Céspedes (2000) show that the construction of the contract is a standard debt
contract in the presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, in which domestic
entrepreneurs are charged a risk premium on their borrowing contracts – this is
done for a one economy as well as for a two good economy that involves a relative
price. We follow them in this respect. 6
In equilibrium, the expected real rate of return to capital should equal the
cost of borrowing, the latter being the composite of the gross riskless international
interest rate scheduled in period t, ιt, and the gross risk premium paid in period















Furthermore, the external finance premium paid by entrepreneurs is endoge-
nous and depends on the ratio of total dollar debt to net worth in an increasing
manner. The higher the ratio of debt to net worth – to be defined shortly –, the
higher the risk premium will be, given increased chances of entrepreneurs going


















6Here we are not dealing with the problem of why international lenders extend loans to non-
tradable producers, considering that their sales are exclusively in domestic currency, unlike
producers of tradables that can export, which might seem a suboptimal behavior from the
point of view of lenders. For related literature see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and
Jeanne (2001).
7See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) for details.
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with F ′ > 0, f ′ > 0, F (1) = 1, f(1) = 1, F (∞) = ∞, f(∞) = ∞.
Moreover, it is straightforward to notice that this essentially implies a risk
premium that is increasing in the leverage of the entrepreneur.8
Entrepreneurs in sector J are assumed to consume (1 − δJ) of their income
and then devote the rest of it to purchase capital, as stated above. This implies
that each period, net worth will consist of the non-consumed returns to capital
























This implies that net worth in sector J during period t increases with output,
the price of capital and prices and decreases with the exchange rate, the inter-
national riskless interest rate and the risk premium. Notice also the following
intertemporal link. The external finance premium paid in period t is the one set
during period t − 1, which at the same time endogenously depends on the net
worth level of period t − 1. This generates the seeds for a shock-propagation
mechanism, because negative shocks during t − 1 will reduce entrepreneur’s net
worth, thus curtailing their ability to purchase capital for period t. In turn,
this is reflected in a higher risk premium which endogenously reduces net worth
for period t, thus propagating the effects of the shock to subsequent periods.
Similarly, this can arise as a consequence of variations in international riskless
8This comes as a result of incorporating (3.24) into (3.27).
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interest rates, unexpected changes in real return to capital or unanticipated real
devaluations; this point is picked up below.
3.1.6 Capital Producers
There is a sector devoted to the production of capital that is sector-specific, in a
standard fashion. Specifically, capital producers in sector J purchase output in
sector J at the end of period t and use it to produce capital that will used by
entrepreneurs in sector J to produce during period t + 1. In order to do so, we
assume that they have a concave production function which reflects the existence
of convex capital adjustments costs; for simplicity, we also assume a depreciation







with Φ′ > 0 and Φ′′ < 0. This implies that the price of capital – consistent with












Goods produced in the non-tradables sector will be either consumed by workers
or by capital producers






and goods domestically produced in the tradable sector will be either consumed
by workers, capital producers or the rest of the world




t + Xt (3.33)
where Xt denotes exports.
9
As in Gali and Monacelli (2002), we impose that the trade balance should be
in equilibrium in steady state. Since the unit mass of consumers are all alike, the
bonds market should clear for an aggregate net supply equal to zero, as in Faia
(2003):
B∗t = 0 (3.34)
3.1.8 Equilibrium
For the purpose of this model, we define a fixed exchange rate policy as the one
that keeps the nominal exchange rate constant, i.e St = St+i ∀i. We define a
flexible exchange rate policy as that in which the nominal exchange rate makes
all the adjustment to keep the nominal aggregate price from fluctuating, i.e.
Pt = Pt+i ∀i, in line with CCV. Note that this can be characterized as the limit
of an inflation target scheme.
9Note that as far as the domestic economy is sufficiently small, in the sense that rest of
the world’s expenditure share in this country’ s goods is small enough cum a unitary elasticity
of substitution, the foreign currency value of exports can be taken as given, as in Céspedes,
Chang and Velasco (2001a, 2001b and 2001c) and Krugman (1999). Alternatively, we could









We define a rational expectations stochastic dynamic general equilibrium as















t }∞t=0 that maximize consumer’s utility, firms’
profits, entrepreneurs’ rate of return and capital producer’s profits given each
sector’s budget constraint and the aggregate economy’s resource constraint, i.e.
that satisfy (3.1), (3.2), (3.4)-(3.14), (3.18)-(3.24), (3.26)-(3.27), (3.29)-(3.33),
along with an exchange rate policy rule – fixed or flexible, as defined above – and




t , ιt and Xt
defined in the appendix.
Given the non-linear nature of the model above described, the solution is
computed by approximating the dynamics of the model around the deterministic
steady state and then observing the optimal response of the economy to different
real shocks arising from the stochastic processes introduced in the previous para-
graph, namely shocks to terms of trade, the international riskless interest rate,
technology in each sector and export demand.10 In the exercise below we only
report the results for shocks to the terms of trade. In the appendix we show the
uniqueness of the steady state of the economy, which only depend on parameter
values. Prior to presenting the results, the next section develops some theoreti-
cal underpinnings that are at the heart of explaining the results obtained in the
impulse response below.
10Obviously, we are considering shocks that can be labelled as ”small”.
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3.2 Nonlinear Effects of Unanticipated Real Price
Changes
As described in the introduction, there are some nonlinearities that arise when
unanticipated changes in real prices occur. This gives rise to system dynamics
in response to small real shocks, in which the credit market is the transmission
mechanism for amplification and propagation. Specifically, this section analyzes
the underlying mechanism in the economy’s response to unanticipated changes
in the real return to capital and unanticipated real devaluations. We find a
strong nonlinearity in net worth and in the risk premium in response to the
mentioned shocks: the elasticity of net worth with respect to these unanticipated
changes in real prices is not constant, but increasing in the degree of leverage of
the economy. Furthermore, given the intrinsic trap in which producers of non-
tradables are involved – the lack of a “rest of the world” market to which they
can re-channel their production when domestic demand is depressed – then the
output composition, or degree of openness of the economy plays a crucial role in
the selection of the optimal exchange rate regime.

































t−1 − P Jt−1NJt−1
)]
(3.36)
Now take expectation on both sides of the latter expression given the information
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be the unanticipated change in the real return to capital in sector J during period
t, U∆R
J
, and the unanticipated devaluation effect on sector J , U∆S
J
, respectively.






















Computing the elasticity of net worth with respect to unanticipated changes




















where the inequality in (3.41) is implied by taking expectations as of t−1 of both
sides (3.37). From (3.41) we observe that the elasticity of net worth with respect
to unanticipated changes in the real return to capital is greater than one.11
11For δJ → 1
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Notice that the size of the elasticity is not constant, but depends on the degree
of leverage, which is essentially the domestic value of foreign debt. This can be
















If the real return to capital decreases unexpectedly, the value of net worth
drops, generating a lower demand for investment. This, in turn, decreases its
price, consequently increasing the risk premium, which reduces net worth further
down, therefore increasing the risk premium, etc., so on and so forth. As a result,
unexpected changes in real return to capital generates a more than proportional
fall in output, through some type of multiplier process. Notice the similarity of
this result with the debt-deflation theory of business cycles due to Irving Fisher
(1933)12 in that unanticipated drops in real prices are the amplification and trans-
mission mechanism for business cycles fluctuations.
By computing the elasticity of net worth with respect to unexpected devalu-























This suggests that whenever unanticipated devaluations occur, net worth de-
creases; furthermore, for high degrees of leverage – i.e. for high levels of the
domestic value of foreign debt – this elasticity is likely to be greater than one in
absolute value. In the latter case, the above mentioned nonlinearity appears: real
12This is similar in spirit to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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devaluations’ effects are increasing in the degree of leverage. Since in the short
run the capital stock is fixed (given from the previous period), then any change in
a relative price affects net worth. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that
since the elasticity of the real value of debt with respect to unanticipated changes
in the real exchange rate equals one, then the nonlinearity is directly transmitted
to the external finance premium: this premium is not only an increasing function
of the degree of leverage, but it is also affected in a nonlinear way by unexpected
changes in unanticipated real devaluations, the impact being greater the higher
the degree of leverage.13 For firms that have a market where they can redirect
their sales after the devaluation, it might be worth paying the extra risk premium
– see (3.26) – but this will not be true for non-tradables.
For economies that are highly leveraged – i.e. highly indebted in foreign cur-
rency – unanticipated devaluations cause net worth and therefore the external
finance premium to increase more than proportionally. This reduces demand for
investment and consequently the price of net worth, thus raising the external
finance premium further, again though a multiplier process, which eventually is
reflected in output as well. In a sense, this works like a debt-deflation (Fisher)
effect for open economies. The magnitude of the effect depends on the degree of
dollarization of debts cum the degree of openness of the economy – i.e. on the
degree of currency mismatch. For relatively closed economies, this transmission
and propagation mechanism effects for shocks gets enlarged because of the greater
impact it generates on producers of non-tradables. This is due to the lack of an
alternative market where they can re-direct their production, which in turn fur-
13The elasticity of risk premium with respect to unanticipated devaluations is also increasing
in the degree of leverage.
28
ther affects the risk premium. As a consequence, this anticipates a differentiated
role for the exchange rate arrangement depending on the output composition of
the economy. And this is due to the unequal effect of this mechanism on different
sectors, as will be shown below.
Another way to put it is that there is a magnification effect though which
unexpected movements in real prices have a substantial effect on the financial
position of entrepreneurs. As will become clear below, this will explain an im-
portant part of the dynamics of the model in the impulse response analysis.
Furthermore, it sets some ground for the discussion short-sharp vs. long-mild
suggested in the introduction.
3.3 Impulse Response Analysis
In this section we study the effects of negative terms of trade shocks. The dynam-
ics of the model are analyzed by observing the evolution of the variables around
the steady state when hit by a ”small” shock. In order to do so, and given the
fundamental non-linearity of the model, we first log-linearize it around the steady
state. The next sections describe the complete log-linearization of the system in
detail, as well as the parametrization of the steady state. It is also shown the
uniqueness of the latter.
Then, we use the log-linear form of the model for experiments simulations.
For the purpose, we assume that the economy is in steady state and is suddenly
affected by a 10% decrease in the international price of home goods, PH∗t ; recall
that we have assumed that the international price of foreign goods is constant
an equal to one in steady state as well as off the steady state. The size of the
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shock is not arbitrary, but taken form the evidence below. From the empirical
chapter below, I analyzed the standard deviation of the residuals. This implied a
shock of size in the range of 5% to 15%. In calibrating the model, the intention
is to replicate the empirical evidence as close as possible. This is obtained by
assuming a shock of 10% (negative decrease in the terms of trade). Also, the
residuals show a persistence of 0.45. This is also included in the simulations
below. Note that the latter value is consistent with Mendoza (1995), who finds
an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.41. It is also worth noting that the disount rate
equals 0.9615. As a result, each period in the impulse-response below corresponds
to a year, assuming an annual interest rate of 4%. Once more, this is to make
the theoretical model comparable with the evidence below.
The exercise is done for what we label “relatively open economies” and for
“relatively closed economies” within the set of small open economies. In this
respect, the first subsection analyzes the impulse-response of a an economy with
a share of 70% of tradables in domestic production. In the second subsection
we change the share of tradables to 30%. As shown in the empirical section
below, and in Magud (2003), these values emerge from observing the data for a
32 country sample covering the period 1980-2001. In the latter, relatively open
economies average a 70% of openness, while relatively closed economies average
30%.
It is worth noting that similar results are obtained for a variety of different
real shocks such as shocks to the international (riskless) interest rate, produc-
tivity shocks, as well as export demand shocks. The case of interest rate shocks
could be considered the most of important of these. Small open economies are fre-
quently affected by fluctuations in this interest rate as a result of counter-cyclical
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monetary policies in large countries. Also, contagion can be characterized in
terms of interest rate volatility. Thus, analyzing these shocks in the context of
the model is a natural extension. Intuitively, increases in the world interest rate
raise the rate paid on foreign currency loans, thus generating similar effects as
real devaluations – supply contractions – as will be shown below. Also, increasing
the opportunity cost of consumption increases savings, thus reducing domestic
demand. In summary, as will clear from the analysis of the impulse response,
shocks to terms of trade are similar in nature to real devaluations. These results
are not reported here.
3.3.1 Uniqueness of Steady State
In this section we show that there exists only one steady state as a function
of parameters, thus permitting log-linearization around the steady state to ana-
lyze impulse response effects of ”small” shocks. As already stated, all variables
without a time subscript will be referred to the economy’s steady state.
As noted above, we have assumed that P F∗t = 1 ∀t and that P
H∗
PF∗ = 1 in steady
state. Also, there are no shocks to productivity in steady state, i.e. AF = AH = 1.
Then, PH = 1 and recalling (3.12) and (3.13), P
H
P F
= 1, thus PH = P F = S.
Consequently, P T = 1.




so that plugging in (3.44) and (3.24) into (3.29) we obtain that







, thus pinning down the risk premium for each sector in steady
state. Note that a necessary condition for the gross risk premium to be greater
than one in steady state is that 0 < δJ ι < 1.
Consequently, there is a unique leverage given by $ = Q
JKJ
P JNJ
> 1, as (3.27)





Since in steady state QJ = P J , then by inspection of (3.31) and (3.30) we
observe that the only adjustment costs in steady state correspond to the depre-
ciation rate, equal to one.






































14That $ > 1 can be observed by inspection of (3.24).
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and plugging it into (3.9) one can show that CH = φCT ; the latter, combined
with (3.49) implies that CF = (1− φ)CT .
On the other hand, from (3.19), and the obtained value for the consumption
























Also, since in equilibrium wages paid in each sector should equal each other,













= 1− ψ (3.54)
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Looking at (3.30) we notice that in steady state Φ(.) = 1, thus pinning down
the capital stock in steady state.
Finally, since there is only one level of leverage in steady state in each sector
and there is a unique K
J
Y J
, we can obtain a unique N
J
Y J




3.3.2 The Linearized Model
The dynamics of the model are analyzed by observing the evolution of the vari-
ables around the steady state when hit by a ”small” shock. In order to do so,
and given the fundamental non-linearity of the model, we firstly log-linearize it
around the steady state. In what follows, all variables without a time subscript
will refer to the economy’s steady state, whereas lower case letters represent the
percentage deviation of each variable from its steady state value. The model
described above can be characterized by the following set of equations, which
for ease of tractability, is separated into 6 blocks: demand, supply, resource con-













t + Γsst (3.56)




t + ΛF c
F
t − cNt = ρpNt − ρφpHt − ρ(1− φ)st (3.58)
cFt − cHt = ς(pHt − st) (3.59)
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(1 + β)wNt − λlNt = wNt−1 + βEt [wt+1] (3.76)
Policy Regimes
st = 0 (3.77)
for fixed exchange rate regimes or
pt = 0 (3.78)
for a flexible exchange rate.15
Finally, the stochastic processes are assumed to be AR(1), with persistent










t−1 + νι (3.79)
15For our purposes, these are exogenous processes. On the contrary, Gertler, Gilchrist and Na-
talucci (2001) deal with endogenous regimes, through Taylor rules; Gali and Monacelli (2002),




t−1 + νpH∗ (3.80)
aHt = ξaHa
H
t−1 + νaH (3.81)
aNt = ξaN a
N
t−1 + νaN (3.82)
xt = ξxxt−1 + νx (3.83)





























































































t represent the log-linear deviations from steady state of ιt and
ηJt , respectively.
Equation (3.55) represents the linearized version of the aggregate consumption
composite (3.8), once the composite for tradables (3.9) has been incorporated.
(3.56) comes from substituting (3.11) into (3.10) and then computing the log-
linear approximation. (3.56) represents the composite price index given the price
of home goods, foreign goods and non-tradable goods, after taking into account
that the international price of foreign goods is constant and equal to one, thus
implying that the price of foreign goods equals the nominal exchange rate in
every period. (3.58) results from the optimality conditions for demand of the
three goods in the economy given relative prices. It is obtained after substituting
(3.9) and (3.11) into (3.19), and shows how each of the relative demands for
foreign, home and non-tradable goods, negatively depend on their relative prices.
Regarding (3.59), it depicts the log-linear version of (3.20), thus displaying the
negative relation with respect to prices that in equilibrium should be observed
regarding the consumption of the two type of tradable goods. PPP is represented
by (3.60), which comes from (3.12), in that the domestic price of home goods must
be equal to the exchange rate plus the international price of the good.
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Production functions for home and non-tradable goods, respectively, are given
by (3.62) and (3.63), and reflect each sector’s production function (3.1). In each
sector, output could be affected by total factor productivity shocks, aHt and a
N
t
respectively; in order to produce output, capital and labor are required.
Resource constraints are given by (3.68) and (3.69) for home goods and non-
tradable goods and represent (3.33) and (3.32), respectively. Non-tradable goods
can either be consumed or used to produce capital. Home goods can also be
exported for the consumption of the rest of the world.
Financial frictions are observed in (3.64) and (3.65) for home and non-tradable
sectors, respectively, corresponding to (3.26). The risk premium in excess of the
riskless international interest rate that firms in each sector pay, in equilibrium,
should equal the expected rate of return on capital purchased today that will be
used to produce tomorrow.
The mentioned external finance premium takes a functional form that is in-
creasing in the entrepreneur’s leverage in each sector, as in (3.27). Specifically,
the external finance premium increases with the ratio of acquired capital to the
entrepreneur’s net worth, i.e. leverage. Thus this risk premium increases, all
else equal, if either the real value of capital or its price increase, but drops when
each sector’s price and/or real net worth increase, thus reflecting the ability of
entrepreneurs to repay their debts. Notice that the elasticity of the risk premium
with respect to its leverage is assumed to be constant only in steady state, and is
given by µ. The log-linear versions are (3.66) and (3.67), respectively.
(3.70) and (3.71) are log-linearized counterparts of (3.29) for each sector,
after (3.24) is taken into account for ease of tractability, and reflect the temporal
evolution of net worth. Notice that, as shown for the steady state of the economy,
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$ > 1. This implies that net worth increases more than proportionally with
output and the sector’s output price, but decreases with the exchange rate, the
riskless international interest rate and the risk premium. Also, net worth increases
with the previous period’s net worth and sectoral output price, as well as with a
higher value of capital from the pervious period, that in turn can arise from an
increase in the level of capital and/or its price.
The usual capital adjustment equations in the Dynamic New Keynesian lit-
erature derived from (3.31) determine the price of capital in each sector, as well
as the production function for capital. This is reflected in (3.72) and (3.73), re-
spectively. It denotes the effects on the price of capital generated by movements
in the capital stock in each sector -recall that we have assumed that capital is
sector-specific- and the dimension of that effects is given by the elasticity ϕ, which
is assumed to be constant in steady state only.
For equilibrium in the labor market, optimally chosen labor supply must be
equal to labor demand in each sector. Expression (3.74) displays the mentioned
equilibrium. It is the result of relative labor supply given by jointly considering
(3.21) and (3.22), as well as labor demand, characterized by (3.6).
Consumers’ budget constraint (3.18) should also be taken into account, as is
depicted in (3.61), binding total consumption according to total wage income.
Notice that (3.75) and (3.76) represent the evolution of sticky wages. Within
each sector during period t only a fraction (1−θ) of workers are allowed to change
their wages for given demand, as in the typical Calvo (1983) scheme. The wage
decision mechanism considers past wages as well as expected future wages given
available information. This generates a forward-looking Phillips curve. (3.75)
and (3.76) result from (3.14).
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Finally, either (3.77), the fixed exchange rate regime, or (3.78), the flexible
exchange rate regime, characterize the policy regime. Each of them is considered
in turn, depending on the exchange rate regime being analyzed.
To conclude, (3.79)-(3.83) represent the stochastic exogenous processes out
of which the shocks arise. As can be observed, all of the them are assumed, in
principle, to be AR(1) processes, unless specifically stated.
Notice that the remaining constants directly depend on steady state values of
endogenous variables, as well as parameters.
3.3.3 Calibration: Parameter Values and Steady State
In this section we lay out the basic parameter values used to calibrate the econ-
omy’s steady state. It is important to remark that this is not intended to be a
strict calibration exercise, but simply a theoretical tool to try to shed some light
on the issue at hand and to analyze the implications of the model. In this regard,
most of the parameter values are taken either from data or extracted from the
exiting quantitative literature.
Preferences: Following Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001), the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution in consumption between tradables and non-tradables,
ρ, equals 2, and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between home and
foreign goods, ς is also equal to 2. The share of tradables in total consumption,
γ, equals 0.5, while the share of home goods in total tradables is assumed to be
φ = 0.8. The yearly discount factor β is assumed to be equal to 0.9615, thus gen-
erating an international yearly riskless interest rate of 4%, consistent with most of
the existent quantitative models. To represent a high degree of pass-through, we
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assume that the contribution to the price index of tradable goods equals 60%.16
As is standard in the Dynamic New Keynesian literature, we assume that the
proportion of individuals that can change their wage in each period, θ, is 0.75.
Finally, ε equals 3 while the scale parameter κ is assumed to be 0.6.
Technology: We assume that the home goods sector is relatively more capital
intensive than the non-tradable sector by imposing that αH = 0.32 and that
αN = 0.20, where αJ is the share of capital in output for sector J = H, N . Also,
the share of labor income obtained in the non-tradable sector, ψ, is assumed to
equal 0.364, as in Mendoza (2001). Regarding the capital production technology,
we follow Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) by considering that ϕ, the price
elasticity of capital, equals 0.25.
Entrepreneurs: δH , the proportion of income that entrepreneurs devote to
investment is assumed to be 0.98, while δN equals 0.90. This is to generate dif-
ferentiated external finance premiums in steady state for each sector. The steady
state external finance premium paid by home entrepreneurs, ηH , is 1%, while
the steady state external finance premium for entrepreneurs in the non-tradable
sector, ηN , equals 10%. The rationale for this is that since non-tradables, by
its own nature, only sell domestically and do not have the chance to re-direct
their sales towards the rest of the world, they are by definition riskier credit sub-
jects than entrepreneurs that invest in home tradables. The former obtain their
profits in domestic currency while their debt is denominated in foreign currency.
Entrepreneurs in the tradable sector, given they have the chance to export are
less exposed to the mentioned currency mismatch, thus pay a lower premium in
16Robustness checks show this assumption to be inessential, only helping for expositional
purposes.
43
steady state. Furthermore, given the one-to-one relationship between risk pre-
mium and leverage in steady state, non-tradables will have a higher leverage in
steady state than tradables.17 For our purposes, then, leverage in steady state
will equal 3.2 for home-sector and 1.2 for non-tradables.18 Furthermore, the elas-
ticity of the risk premium in steady state is assumed to 3.2 for entrepreneurs in
the home sector, while only 1.7 for the ones in the non-tradables’.19
These parameter values imply that in steady state, the capital-output ratio,
KJ
Y J
for J = H, N , will equal 0.326 in the tradable sector and 0.18 in the non-




for home goods and 0.82 for non-tradables. Notice that these values are approxi-
mately in line with those in Mendoza (2001). Finally, the parameters imply that
in steady state the exports to home-sector output ratio, X
Y H
, will equal 0.068 in
steady state.
Regarding the stochastic shock processes, we assume that the all of them
follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelations coefficients given by ξaH = ξaN =
ξx = 0, for the purpose of this exercise, while we take ξpH∗ = 0.45 in line with
Mendoza (1995) estimates of the autocorrelation coefficient for terms of trade
shocks in LDC’s. Furthermore, this figure was obtained in the empirical section
below, by observing the residuals of the estimated series for terms of trade shocks.
Also, using this residuals, it was found that a one standard deviation shock to
the terms of trade corresponds to a reduction in the terms of trade between 5%
17This should be reflected in the debt contract.
18This values are chosen for expositional purposes. When we check for robustness, the qual-
itative results are not altered for different values of these parameters.
19Again, we check for robustness and the qualitative results are not modified.
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Parameter Description Value
ρ intratemp. elasticity of substit. T-NT 2
ς intratemp. elasticity of substit. H-F 2
γ share of tradables in total consumption 0.5
φ share of home goods in total tradables 0.8
β yearly discount factor 0.9615
P T
P contribution to the price index of tradable goods 0.6
θ prop.indiv. that can change their wage in each period 0.75
ε 3
κ scale parameter 0.6
αH share of capital to output for sector H 0.32
αN share of capital to output for sector N 0.20
ψ share of labor income from NT 0.364
ϕ price elasticity of capital 0.25
δH prop. income entrep. devote to investment in H 0.98
δN proportion of income that entrepreneurs devote to investment in NT 0.90
$H leverage in H 3.2
$N leverage in N 1.2
µH elasticity of the risk premium in H 3.2
µN elasticity of the risk premium in N 1.7
Table 3.1: Steady state parameter values for simulations.
and 15%.
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r international yearly riskless interest rate 0.04
ηH risk premium in H 0.01
ηN risk premium in N 0.10
KH
Y H
capital output ratio H 0.326
KN
Y N
capital output ratio N 0.180
CH
Y H
H consumption to output ratio 0.60
CN
Y N
N consumption to output ratio 0.82
X
Y H
exports to home-sector output ratio 0.068
Table 3.2: Implied steady state values.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Relatively Open Economies
As Figure 3.1 illustrates for the case in which the tradable to GDP ratio equals
0.7, when a relatively open economy is hit by a terms of trade shock, output
falls independently of whether the exchange rate regime is flexible or fixed. Note
the consistency with conventional wisdom in that flexible exchange rates perform
better as a real shock absorber. We observe that if the country operates under a
float the output drop on impact is smaller than if the country’s regime is a pure
fix, as the previous literature claims. Depending on parameter values, we observe
at most one time period during which output under a flexible regime is below
output under a fixed regime.
In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we observe the temporal trajectory of several vari-
ables. As a result of the shock, aggregate demand for consumption goods de-
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Figure 3.1: Output dynamics with flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes
for relatively open economies.
creases. Moreover, given the change in relative prices, the relative demand for
non-tradables increases: the demand for non-tradables does not decrease as much
as demand for home goods regardless of the exchange rate regime.
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Figure 3.2: Consumption, prices, output, labor, external finance premium
and net worth dynamics with flexible exchange rate regimes for relatively
open economies.
With flexible exchange rates – Figure 3.2 – the nominal devaluation that
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accommodates the negative terms of trade shock drives the price of home goods
up, reflecting the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations. Since demand for
non-tradables decreases, so does its price to clear the domestic market. This
explains the real exchange rate depreciation observed in Figure 3.4. Output
drops in both sectors, as well as labor. Notice that risk premium increase in
both sectors. However, it increases substantially more in the non-tradable sector.
In turn, this is reflected in net worth. The latter increases on impact for the
home goods, while it decreases for the non-tradable sector. This results from the
combined effect of the price fluctuation above described, as well as the increase
in the real value of debt triggered by the real devaluation.
If the economy is under a fixed exchange rate regime, similar patterns are
observed regarding aggregate consumption. This can be seen in Figure 3.3. Also,
the relative demand for non-tradables increases: demand for non-tradables drops
less than demand for home goods. Again, this results from the relative price
change: prices for home goods are almost constant, while the price for non-
tradables decreases. Notice in Figure 3.4 that the real exchange rate depreciation
under a fixed exchange rate is smaller than when the economy is ruled by a flexible
regime. It can be seen that the risk premium increases proportionally more in
the non-tradable sector, compared with the home goods sector. Once more, this
is reflected in the net worth plot.
In summary, output is reduced in both sectors of the economy, regardless of
the exchange rate regime. However, the aggregate output drop is deeper if the
economy’s exchange rate regime is fixed. The intuition for this is as follows. In
the presence of a flexible regime, the negative shock triggers a real depreciation
that decreases domestic demand, thus reducing firms’ sales in domestic markets.
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Figure 3.3: Consumption, output, labor, external finance premium and net
worth and prices dynamics with fix exchange rate regimes for relatively open
economies.
Furthermore, the depreciation increases the foreign currency repayment of the
debt for entrepreneurs in both the home and non-tradable sectors, thus reduc-
ing net worth. In turn, this curtails the ability to purchase capital to produce
the following period because of the increased risk premium.20 For tradables,
however, the real depreciation implies an increase in competitiveness, enabling
them to re-direct their output towards the rest of the world, unlike producers of
non-tradables. The former, although with reductions in quantities, experience
a relative price increase, compared to non-tradables, which impacts the value of
output. Therefore, producers of tradables are not affected as much as producers
20Recall that the risk premium is endogenous and nonlinearly increasing in the entrepreneur’s
leverage. Thus, an increase in real – in foreign currency units – debt accompanied by a decrease
in net worth implies a reduced ability to repay debts (i.e. a higher leverage), thus triggering
an increase in the risk premium.
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of non-tradables are. Furthermore, individuals anticipate an increase in demand
for home goods, thus making the external finance premium not increase as much.
This allows entrepreneurs in this sector to purchase additional capital, as it is
observable from (3.25). Since most of the output generated in the economy is
tradable, flexible exchange rate are preferred. If instead the economy were to
be under a fixed regime, the expansionary effects for the tradable sector com-
ing from competitiveness would not exist. In this case, although tradables and
non-tradables producers will be less affected by the increase in the burden of
their dollar liabilities, tradables producers will still be worse on balance. As long
as there is a high share of domestic output that is tradable, fixed regimes will
benefit only a small fraction of the economy. This explains why we observe that
for a relatively open economy the output drop is deeper with a fixed exchange
rate than when the economy lives under a flexible regime. This is also reflected
in the external finance premium. By inspection of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, notice
that the external finance premium increases less for the home goods sector under
flexible exchange rates. It also increases more for non-tradables, but this is due
to the economy being relatively open. Also, net worth in the tradable sector in-
creases with flexible exchange rates. This results from the competitiveness effect:
although the external finance premium increases, it is worth paying it.
As the reader might have already noticed, the above results are in line with
conventional wisdom, even though balance sheet effects are included. These re-
sults are qualitatively similar to Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001) and Gertler,
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2001). The specific reason for this is that the ratio of
tradables to GDP is sufficiently high and that the aforementioned papers deal
with economies in which all goods are tradable. Thus, although this model is
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Figure 3.4: Real Exchange Rate dynamics with flexible and fixed exchange
rate regimes for relatively open economies.
3.4.2 Relatively Closed Economies
Let us now repeat the exercise with only one minor modification: the ratio of
tradables to GDP now equals 0.3, representing a relatively closed economy.21
In this case, we observe in Figure 3.5 that the economy’s response to the
same terms of trade shock is larger on impact when the economy is ruled by a
flexible exchange rate regime, unlike the previous case. Furthermore, there is
higher volatility under the latter regime, suggesting a welfare reduction.
As shown in Section (3.2), the explanation for this pattern comes from the
endogenous effects of unanticipated changes in real prices: when there is a fixed
regime, although firms in the home goods cannot use the instantaneous realign-
ment of relative prices to re-channel the domestic demand drop to the rest of the
world, non-tradables do not observe an increase in the value of debt. This implies
21See the Appendix for the complete set of parameter values.
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Figure 3.5: Output dynamics with flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes
for relatively closed economies.
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Figure 3.6: Consumption, output, labor, external finance premium, net
worth and prices dynamics with flexible exchange rate regimes for relatively
closed economies.
that the external finance premium does not increase as much (for both sectors,
but having a higher incidence for non-tradables) and therefore permits them to
manage the shock more easily.
As before, we can see in Figure 3.7 that domestic demand for consumption
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Figure 3.7: Consumption, output, labor, external finance premium, net
worth and prices dynamics with fixed exchange rate regimes for relatively
closed economies.
goods decreases, but demand for non-tradables does not decrease as much, due to
the change in relative prices. This occurs regardless of the exchange rate regime.
Also, we notice the pass-though effect that occurs with flexible exchange rates:
home goods prices increase. At the same time, non-tradables prices decrease
to clear a depress domestic market, as in the relatively open economy. Again,
this implies the real exchange rate depreciation pictured in Figure 3.4 above. In
line with the relatively open economy, when the economy is under a fixed regime,
since the price for home goods as well as the nominal exchange rate do not change
much while the price of non-tradables drops, the real exchange rate depreciates.
However, the real depreciation is smaller on impact if the economy is ruled by a
fixed exchange rate.
As in the previous section, output and labor drop in both sectors in response
to the negative terms of trade shock. The external finance premium increases in
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both sectors, due to the decline in net worth, as expected.
In summary, we observe that for a relatively closed economy, a fixed exchange
rate regime seems to outperform a flexible regime, contrary to our previous find-
ings. The section below analyzes the origins of these differences.
3.5 Policy Implications: “Short-Sharp vs. Long-
Mild”
The above discussion (in line with conventional wisdom) might suggest the bene-
fits of bearing the whole burden of relative price adjustment at one point in time
– the Short-Sharp case – instead of over a longer period – the Long-Mild case.
That will be the case if the structure of the external finance premium is not taken
into consideration. As shown in section (3.2), as long as the percentage increase
in external finance premium is nonlinear in the entrepreneur’s leverage, the ef-
fects of unanticipated real devaluations depend on the initial degree of leverage.
Specifically, unanticipated drops in real returns to capital and/or real deprecia-
tions generate a more than proportional decrease in net worth. In turn, that will
imply a more than proportional increase in the external finance premium, thus
reducing the ability of firms to invest. Consequently, the lack of sufficient net
worth becomes more “binding” a constraint to finance capital investments. The
higher is the external finance premium elasticity with respect to unanticipated
changes in real return to capital or unanticipated real devaluation is, the larger
this effect on financing the purchase of capital is.
This gives rise a role for progressive relative price adjustments, because they
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enable entrepreneurs to cope with the shock without going bankrupt. Specifically,
this suggests that a “Short-Sharp” recession may be more harmful than a “Long-
Mild” recession. The intuition is the following. With relative prices progressively
adjusting, the effect on the external finance premium (through the decrease in
net worth that the real depreciation generates via the increase in the foreign-
currency value of the entrepreneur’s debt) is not as marked as when the exchange
rate adjustments instantaneously. As a result, investment, although it drops,
does not drop as sharply with a fixed exchange rate as with a flexible regime.
Consequently, the output contraction is smoothed out. In other words, the fixed
regime allows forward looking firms and lenders to accommodate a real shock
without an output effect as large as with a flexible regime.
Furthermore, with a flexible exchange rate, shocks cause entrepreneur’s net
worth to become suddenly ‘more binding’. This is due to the high elasticity of net
worth with respect to unanticipated changes in relative prices. Since the higher
the leverage, the greater this elasticity is, the larger the jump in the external
finance premium will be following real price changes. In turn, this triggers a
contraction in the non-tradable sector. Specifically, many entrepreneurs in this
sector will go bankrupt due to the lack of time to accommodate the price change
without large drops in investment. Notice that for tradables, the effect of the
real exchange rate is smaller because of the expanded foreign demand that is
observed after the devaluation – i.e the higher competitiveness that results from
the devaluation.
All the above is also related to the intertemporal link described in Kiyotaki-
Moore (1997). As a consequence of the shock, entrepreneurs reduce their current
purchase of capital. This reduces their own revenue and consequently the future
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value of net worth. Furthermore, the reduction in prices makes the drop in the
value of net worth larger. This curtails their ability to purchase capital in the
next period. As a consequence of this, next period’s net worth goes further
down, further raising the external finance premium. In other words, this process
– product of the shock – reduces capital purchases and consequently net worth,
in a sort of ”dynamic multiplier” effect.
A related issue is to define a relatively open as opposed to a relatively closed
economy. Experiments suggest that in my model the threshold share of tradables
below which a fixed regime outperforms a flexible regime is around 60%. However,
one should not regard this threshold as a precise policy recommendation, since
this calibration may not be valid for a particular country in question.
It should be pointed out that these results where checked for robustness.
Specifically, the same exercises were re-run several times, changing each of the
parameters one at a time. This was done not only for the parameters values
reported in the literature, but also for several ”unrealistic” values, so as to verify if
at least there could be a theoretically possible different result. However, the only
differences that were observed were of quantitative, but not qualitative nature.
For the reader’s reference, the range of some parameters considered were: the
elasticity of substitution among domestic goods between 10 and 0.5, the ratio of
home goods in tradables from 0.1 to 0.97, the elasticity of risk premium in the
range 1 to 4, leverage for each sector between 1.1 and 3.8, and α for each sector
in the 0.15 - 0.5 range. Also, we tested labor income shares quite different from
those empirically observed, as in Mendoza (2001), various discount factors in the
interval 0.95-0.9985, and others.22
22It is worth mentioning that, for completeness, the exercise was also performed using the
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It is worth mentioning, though, that the qualitative strength of the results do
depend on the degree of persistence of the shock. Specifically, the more persistent
the shock is, the higher the benefits of fixed exchange rates. For the higher the
persistence, the lower the drop in output and the faster the recovery, especially
under a fix exchange rate.




Exchange Rate Regime Choice and Country
Characteristics: an Empirical Investigation into the Role
of Openness
4.1 Some Evidence: Testing the Model with a
Near VAR Approach
Using a VAR approach to estimate the dynamic response of several variables to
shocks usually implies imposing some restrictions on the temporal correlation
of the variables. The standard way is to consider a Choleski decomposition of
stochastic terms. Given the latter, the ordering of the variables in the VAR
carries the burden of determining the correlations among the stochastic terms
corresponding to the endogenous variables.
Following Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986), however, theoretical consider-
ations should rule the restrictions to be imposed on the structural form of the
model. Specifically, the restrictions will indicate the interrelation among the en-
dogenous variables such that the correlations between the residuals are consistent
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being the number of equations in the system, for the model to be identified. This
procedure is usually labelled as a structural VAR.
Broda (2000) showed that for a small open economy affected by terms of
trade shocks, this identification strategy is simplified, because we can impose
the restriction that terms of trade are not affected by other endogenous vari-
ables of the model, reducing the number of other restrictions required. However,
given that one variable (terms of trade) is not explained by the other endogenous
variables, the model should be estimated by SUR to gain efficiency. This is com-
monly known as a near VAR. We will use this strategy, noting that robustness
checks were performed by running standard Bernanke-Sims procedures without
substantial differences. The latter results are presented in the appendix.
4.1.1 Implementation
When focusing on small open economies, the theoretical support for using the
near VAR approach is relatively straightforward. For this type of country, fluc-
tuations in the terms of trade are totally exogenous because the ability to affect
international prices is ruled out by definition. Granger-Sims causality tests were
performed in order to analyze whether the degree of openness caused fluctuations
in terms of trade.1 The null hypothesis of exogeneity could not be rejected.2
1Furthermore, Alesina and Wagner (2003) show that the degree of openness is not statis-
tically significant in explaining the choice of the exchange rate regime ruling out endogeneity
problems.
2We obtained an F-statistic of 1.8764, for 12 lags and 295 degrees of freedom, with a signif-
icance of 0.0368. Broda (2000) also performs Granger causality tests for terms of trade in his
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Let a vector of endogenous variables be Yit, for observation i at period t. The
vector autoregression, in structural form, can be expressed as
A0Yit = A(L)Yit + uit (4.1)
A(L) = A1L + A2L
2 + A3L
3 + ... + ApL
p
in which A(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator of order p, and uit is the
vector of stochastic disturbance terms. For stationarity purposes, the model is
estimated in first differences.3 The variables that we consider are terms of trade,











The exogeneity of the terms of trade is imposed by assuming that in A0,
ap12 = a
p










Given this, the coefficient estimates can be recovered from the reduced form4
set of developing countries and cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity as well.
3The series were tested for unit roots. These tests suggested the need to estimate the model
in first differences.
4See Broda (2000) for further details.
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Yit = Π(L)Yit + eit (4.4)
where Π(L) = A−10 A(L) and eit = A
−1
0 uit. The advantage of this procedure is
that the only required estimates come from the reduced form of the model; these
coefficient estimates are then used to compute and graph the impulse-response
of the economy to shocks to the terms of trade.
To capture the effects that other variables might have on the observed dy-
namics of the endogenous variables, we control for three variables that seem to be
important, a priori, for developing open economies: the current account balance,
a measure of financial development, given by the excess of M2 over M1 (calcu-
lated as a proportion of GDP), and the spread that domestic bonds pay, over
equal maturity bonds issued by the United States Treasury. Then, in a general
form, the structural form of the model becomes:
A0Yit = A(L)Yit + B(L)Xit + uit (4.5)
where the vector Xit includes the mentioned control variables and B(L) is a
polynomial matrix in the lag operator. In reduced form, this turns into
Yit = Π(L)Yit + Φ(L)Xit + vit (4.6)












We tested for the optimal number of lags by way of a likelihood ratio test and
found that it was optimal to choose one lag instead of two.5
The data was pooled in a panel after the mean for each variable in each
country was subtracted. Countries were ranked according to the time average of
their degree of openness (exports plus imports over GDP).6
The classification of the exchange rate regime is a controversial issue. We
used the definitions from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), who classify regimes in 15
different categories. This enables us to define alternative scenarios in which an
exchange rate regime can be considered either a peg or a float. There are subtle
differences within each category, thus converting the exchange rate regime to a
quasi continuous variable instead of binary one. Clearly, for practical purposes a
binary variable has to be defined, but the cut-off between a float or a peg can be
varied across specifications.7
The VAR was estimated separately for ‘flexible’ and for ‘fixed’ observations.
For each exchange rate regime, the VAR was run separately for subsets of rel-
atively ‘open’ or relatively ‘closed’ economies. Different cut-off values for the
degree of openness were experimented to find a threshold for which the output
effects of terms of trade shocks differ across exchange rate regime. The average
degree of openness for relatively open economies was approximately 70%, whereas
for relatively closed economies it was around 30% – values that were consistently
5This results are available from the author upon request.
6A sensitivity test was done by ranking countries using openness at different points in time,
such as the last period’s observation, first period’s observation, etc. Results were robust to
these type of variations.
7See the Appendix for further classification details.
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used in the simulations above. Interestingly, as will be shown in detail below, the
results for the full sample are similar in spirit to Broda (2000): flexible exchange
rate regimes perform better than fixed exchange rates in response to terms of
trade shocks. However, results are different when the degree of openness is taken
into account.
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Prior to the formal econometric analysis, we consider some basic descriptive
statistics. Table 4.1 presents the mean, median and standard deviation for GDP,
the degree of openness, the real effective exchange rate, the current account bal-
ance, the spread and the level of financial development. The sample is composed
of 32 countries for the period 1980-2001.
Some interesting remarks come from observing the degree of volatility of these
variables. The real effective exchange rate is the most volatile variable, as one
might have expected, followed by GDP and the spread on domestic bonds. The
least volatile variable is the current account balance. The latter shows that
on average, small open economies tend to run deficits to supplement domestic
savings. Also, we observe that, on average, the spread paid by these countries is
only 262 basis points.
When the sample is split according to the exchange rate regime, we observe in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 that mean GDP is higher for countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes, but at a cost of a higher volatility. As expected, the real exchange rate
volatility for fixed regimes is substantially lower, which permits these countries
to run, on average, higher current account deficits. Compared to the complete
sample, fixed regimes experience a lower mean real effective exchange rate level.
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Openness GDP REER CAB Spread Fin. Dev.
Mean 56.72 5522.87 12680.61 -4.29 262.28 32.67
Std. Dev. 32.67 6015.23 267564.4 7.21 5303.13 18.66
Median 47.85 3487.72 103.31 -3.47 10.98 28.70
Coef. Var. 0.576 1.089 21.100 1.680 20.219 0.571
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the complete sample of countries.
Consistently with this, the mean spread paid by fixers is markedly lower and less
volatile than the one paid by floaters, while the mean financial development level
is higher for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.8
GDP REER CAB Spread Fin. Dev.
Mean 5426.81 23694.56 -4.05 497.15 28.72
Std. Dev. 5911.25 366479.6 7.39 7394.54 18.14
Median 3671.86 100 -3.44 11.90 23.44
Coef. Var 1.089 15.479 1.825 14.873 0.597
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for countries with flexible exchange rates.
8This evidence is consistent with Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein (1999), except
that they considered Latin American countries only.
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GDP REER CAB Spread Fin. Dev.
Mean 5632.35 126.71 -4.58 137.1 37.19
Std. Dev. 6138.80 42.41 6.98 16.86 18.24
Median 3238.27 107.36 -3.59 9.64 36.99
Coef. Var. 1.090 0.335 1.524 1.230 0.490
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for countries with fixed exchange rates.
4.1.3 Results
Given the nature of the the restrictions imposed, the system was estimated using
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). It was found that a threshold occurs
when the degree of openness reaches the value 40: upon this, the output effects
of terms of trade shocks depend on the exchange rate arrangement.
Figure 4.1 (left panel) shows the impulse response of a relatively open economy
– a country for which the degree of openness is greater than or equal to 40
– affected by a temporary negative shock to terms of trade of size equal to one
standard deviation. Table A.3 in the Appendix displays the estimated coefficients
of the effects of terms of trade when the economy is under a fixed exchange rate
as well as for a floating regime, for open and closed economies.
As can be observed, in line with conventional wisdom, flexible exchange rates
perform better in absorbing the negative shock for relatively open economies: on
impact, the negative jump on GDP is smaller than in the case of a fixed exchange
rate. Regarding the dynamics, output takes more time to recover if the economy
is ruled by a fixed arrangement, while for flexible regimes there is the possibility
of a temporary expansion before the economy returns to steady state. It can be
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Response for relatively open economies (left panel) and
relatively closed economies (right panel) in presence of fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes.
observed that the distance of output from its steady state value is always smaller
when the economy is under a flexible exchange rate.
In terms of the magnitude of the dynamics, these are the impulse-responses
to 1 standard deviation shocks. Looking at the residuals, this deviation equals
approximately 10%. As a result, the figure displays output drops in the range
of 2.5% to 6%. As the reader might have notice, these figures are of the same
order of magnitude as the ones in the theoretical model above, thus reflecting the
importance of the policy implications of the paper.
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix reports the variance decomposition of
GDP. For open economies, shocks to the terms of trade are more important
for GDP volatility than shocks to the real exchange rate. Furthermore, this is
observed whether the exchange rate regime is flexible or fixed.
When relatively closed economies are considered, on the contrary, fixed ex-
change rates perform better. As can be observed in Figure 4.1 (right panel),
on impact fixed regimes are not affected as much as floats. Furthermore, the
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recovery is much faster with a fixed exchange rate, and a potential expansionary
effect appears in the transition. Contrary to relatively open economies, the dis-
tance between the output trajectory and the steady state is always smaller if the
economy is ruled by a fixed regime, rather than a float.
The variance decomposition – Table A.2 in the Appendix – again shows that
terms of trade shocks play an important role in explaining the variation in GDP
and in real effective exchange rates.
In summary, although conventional wisdom holds when we focus on relatively
open economies, in that floating regimes should be preferred to fixed arrange-
ments, the opposite is true when we consider relatively closed economies. As
noted above, by inspection of Figure 4.1 it is straightforward to see that the out-
put effects of negative terms of trade shocks depend strongly on the degree of
openness of the economy.
4.1.4 Robustness
Now I pool the data without splitting the sample according to the degree of
openness, but still splitting between flexible and fixed regimes. In this case, we
are doing a similar exercise to the one in Broda (2000). Although Broda controls
for a measure of degree of openness, he does not split the sample by openness.
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse responses for this case; coefficients are presented
in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix. As can be observed, when we pool all
the countries in our sample – performing the same SUR procedure – the results
coincide with Broda’s: flexible exchange rate regimes perform better in coping
with a terms of trade shock. This suggests the importance of splitting the sample
according to degree of openness of the economy. Also, similar results are obtained
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when the Bernanke-Sims procedure is utilized, as Figure 4.4 shows.
















Figure 4.2: Impulse Response for the entire sample -without differentiating
for the degree of openness of the economy- in presence of fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes.
As another robustness check we consider an alternative estimation procedure
based on the Bernanke and Sims structural VAR method. For this, we have to
impose some theoretically based restrictions on the causality of the residuals.
For a system of n equations, we need at least n
2−n
2
restrictions for the system
to be identified. Should the number of restrictions exceed this, we can test
the overidentification restrictions. For our purposes, we have 3 equations, so
we need only 3 restrictions for the system to be correctly identified. Assuming
the exogeneity of terms of trade imposes two restrictions: a12 = a13 = 0 ∀p.
Therefore, a third restriction in required.
We are going to extract the extra restriction from the model above. Net worth
that entrepreneurs use to finance capital acquisition negatively depends on the
real exchange rate. Given that firm’s output is directly related to entrepreneurs
ability to provide capital, and therefore to their net worth, we cannot impose







































Figure 4.3: Impulse Response for relatively open and relatively closed
economies in presence of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes when
restrictions are directly imposed in the stochastic disturbance terms, à la
Bernanke-Sims.
contrary, given that capital in the model is pre-determined, we can safely assume
that the current real exchange rate should not be affected by the current output










Figure 4.3 and Table A.4 reflect the results of these exercises. Note how
similar these figures are to Figure 4.1. The same result holds when we consider
the complete sample using the Bernanke-Sims methodology.
Notice that the qualitative results remain the same despite the change in the
methodology. When dealing with relatively open economies, common wisdom
reigns, so flexible exchange rate regimes work better in shielding the economy
from real shocks. On the contrary, fixed exchange rate arrangements do a bet-
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Response for the entire sample -without differentiating
for the degree of openness of the economy- in presence of fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes when restrictions are directly imposed in the stochas-
tic disturbance terms, à la Bernanke-Sims.
ter job if the economy is relatively closed. The temporal trajectories of output
resemble the near VAR closely.
Also, similar results are obtained for the variance decomposition, in that the
terms of trade fluctuations are important for GDP and real effective exchange




The debate on the optimal exchange rate regime for emerging markets is far from
closed. In the presence of nominal rigidities, the conventional wisdom for small
open economies is that flexible exchange rates regimes improve the country’s
ability to cope with real shocks. This results from the advantage of a flexible
nominal exchange rate that instantaneously accommodates changes in the real
exchange rate without major real effects.
In the context of partial equilibrium models, some critics advocate fixed ex-
change rates as better real shock absorbers. Given foreign-currency denominated
debt, real debt fluctuations can generate perverse real effects on the economy at
business cycles frequencies. However, existing general equilibrium models incor-
porating balance sheet effects find that flexible exchange rates are still better at
absorbing real shocks than fixed regimes.
This manuscript attempts to shed some light on one aspect of the analysis
that has been apparently overlooked. The degree of openness of the economy
plays a crucial role in determining the relative pros and cons in the adoption of
an exchange rate regime for an emerging country. When an economy is highly
open to world goods markets (i.e. if it produces a substantial amount of tradables
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as a percentage of GDP), the conventional wisdom still holds, notwithstanding
the currency denomination of the country’s debt. Introducing financial frictions
enlarges the impact and propagation of the shocks, but does not overturn the
qualitative advantage of flexible regimes in insulating the economy from real
shocks.
However, for relatively closed economies, specifically those for which the com-
ponent of non-tradables in GDP is relatively high, the effects are the opposite.
For a flexible regime, fluctuations in the exchange rate in response to negative
terms of trade shocks imply increasing foreign-currency-denominated debts with
decreasing domestic revenues. In response to a shock for which domestic demand
decreases, producers of tradables have the ability to re-direct their output to
the rest of the world. However, producers of non-tradables are restricted to a
depressed domestic market. Furthermore, in the presence of financial frictions,
this implies an increased external finance premium that is exacerbated for the
non-tradable sector because its nature does not allow it to escape the currency
mismatch.
Moreover, there is an intertemporal link similar in nature to Irving Fisher’s
(1933) debt-deflation theory.1 Entrepreneurs that currently observe a nonlinearly
increased external finance premium due to unanticipated devaluations or changes
in the real return to capital are precluded from purchasing enough capital. This
reduces their ability to produce next period, and consequently decreases their
future net worth. In turn, this increases their future external finance premium.
Since rational individuals anticipate this, the current period’s external finance
1As formalized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (2000) for closed economies
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premium i increased, and this generates an amplification of the current negative
shock. Furthermore, the external finance premium increases nonlinearly in re-
sponse to unanticipated changes in the real return to capital or unanticipated
real devaluations.
As I argued before, the above mentioned effect impacts more on entrepreneurs
that do not have a market where they can re-channel their output during a
domestic recession, i.e. in non-tradables. As a result, the size of this sector
in the economy ends up determining whether flexible exchange rates or fixed
regimes should be preferred. Specifically, given foreign-currency-denominated
debt, countries with a high degree of openness should prefer flexible regimes if
they are mainly affected by real shocks. On the other hand, relatively closed
economies will better absorb real shocks in fixed exchange rate regimes, contrary
to conventional wisdom.2
At the empirical level, there is mixed evidence in the existing literature on
the relative performance of exchange rate regimes. In the current study, I use
the methodology proposed in Broda (2000), who advocates floats for small open
economies, but I split the sample according to the degree of openness of the
economy. When I pool the data so as to include all countries, I too find that
floating regimes perform better. When I split the sample, this result still holds
for relatively open economies. However, the opposite is true for relatively closed
economies: fixed exchange rate regimes outperform floats in coping with real
shocks.
I generate these results by imposing terms of trade exogeneity into the struc-
2This is also related to Mundell (1960) Optimal Currency Areas theory, in which a small
open economy mainly affected by real shocks should adopt a fixed exchange rate regime.
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tural form of a VAR model and estimating the coefficients by SUR.3 Results
were checked for robustness using the Bernanke -Sims methodology, with similar
results.
There are some interesting extensions to this model which are part of my
current research agenda, but they are still work in progress. First, the govern-
ment should be included. In the context of a flexible exchange rate regime for
a relatively closed economy, and assuming that the government issues its own
debt in foreign currency as the privates sector does, two effects arise: (i) if the
economy is hit by a negative terms of trade shock that requires a jump in the
exchange rate, the real burden of the public sector will automatically increase
given its decreased ability to honor its foreign currency denominated obligations,
while its tax revenues are denominated in domestic (and depreciated) currency
decrease; this is a static effect; (ii) but there is a dynamic effect as well: the
jump in the exchange rate is contractionary in terms of output, and thus reduces
tax revenues. Then, by focusing on the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government, it seem obvious that the derivative of the debt path increases: the
devaluation does not only generate an increase in the government’s stock of debt,
but also in its growth rate; this will in turn increase the probability of default.4
Furthermore, if private sector’s risk premium is attached to the government’s risk
premium – sort of country risk – the mentioned effect gets amplified.
Another extension focuses on the nominal rigidities of the model. Wages
stickiness need not be the same under flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes.
Specifically, the degree of wage indexation should be an optimal response to the
3Because of the near VAR structure of the restrictions.
4Which is increasing in the initial debt level. See Magud (2001).
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exchange rate regime, instead of being the same in each regime. Endogeneiz-
ing the probability of wage setting according to the exchange rate regime would
be a natural next step. To do so, a mechanism to compare the wage adjust-
ment speed for various exchange rate regimes is required. In order to do so, a
Nash-bargaining set up à la Mortesen-Pissarides captures the differentiated wage
indexation scheme contingent on the exchange rate regime.
Another (related) extension to consider which could also be endogenous with
respect to the exchange rate regime. Specifically, by allowing domestic work-
ers to channel their savings to entrepreneurs, the latter will choose their debt




A.1 Data and Additional Tables
A.1.1 List of Countries
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
A.1.2 The Data
We look at the 32 countries listed above during the time period 1980-2001, us-
ing annual data. The series include purchasing-power-parity-adjusted GDP per
capita, taken from World Development Indicators (WDI). The real effective ex-
change rate, based on consumer prices, was computed by Cashin, Céspedes and
Sahay (2002) using data from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Infor-
mation Notice System (INS). They compute the real exchange rate by consider-
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ing the nominal exchange rate weighted by the bilateral exchange trade averages
compared with trading partner’s currencies, to get the nominal effective exchange
rate, which is then adjusted for differences between domestic price levels (mea-
sured by the consumer price index) and the foreign price level, the latter being
the trade-weighted average of trading partners’ consumer price indices. The ef-
fective computation of this real effective exchange rate is done by a geometric
average. These authors, also compute a terms of trade meassure which they call
the real price of commodity exports. This is computed as the nominal price of
commodity exports deflated by the International Monetary Fund’s price index
of manufactured exports.1 Again, the nominal price of commodity exports was
computed by means of a geometric average.2
The degree of openness is approximated by the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP, taken from IFS. A more precise measure of the degree of openness is the
ratio of non-tradables to GDP; lack of data made us use the mentioned proxy.
However, for those countries for which there is data, I examined the correlation
between the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP and the share of agriculture
plus manufacturing in GDP. The correlation between these measures is high,
supporting the proxy used in this paper.
The control variables are the current account balance, extracted from WDI,
the spread paid on domestic bonds, realtive to United States Treasury bonds, of
the same maturity, and an indicator of financial development, measured as the
difference between M2 and M1, as share of GDP, both obtained from WDI.
The exchange rate regime classification is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff
1This is referred in the literature as the commodity terms of trade.
2See Cashin et al for a detailed description of these measures.
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(2002), in which a de facto classification is obtained by looking at market-determined
parallel exchange rates. This permits us to increase our degrees of freedom when
splitting countries according to the exchange rate regime, because their study
identifies 15 different exchange rate arrangements. We included as fixed regimes
the ones that according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) can be considered as: (i)
no separate tender; (ii) pre announced peg or currency board arrangement; (iii)
pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%; (iv)
de facto peg; (v) pre announced crawling peg; (vi) pre announced crawling band
that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%; (vii) de facto crawling peg; and (viii)
de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 2%. The flexible
regimes were the ones classified as: (i) pre announced crawling band that is wider
or equal to +/- 2%; (ii) defacto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to
+/- 5%; (iii) de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/- 5%; (iv)
moving band that is narrower than or equal +/- 2% (i.e. allows for depreciation
over time); (v) managed floating; (vi) freely floating, and; (vii) freely falling.
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Flexible Fixed
TOT GDP REER TOT GDP REER
GDP 2.422 97.362 0.205 3.678 95.233 1.089
REER 4.661 0.063 95.294 12.532 1.806 85.662
Table A.1: Variance decomposition for open economies with flexible and fixed
exchange rate regimes.
Flexible Fixed
TOT GDP REER TOT GDP REER
GDP 14.509 84.431 1.060 11.973 86.227 1.798
REER 5.206 1.128 93.666 49.53 0.226 50.722





























































































































Figure A.1: Economy’s interactions
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Open with Flex Open with Fix Closed with Flex Closed with Fix
a021 0.6766 2.0510 3.2961 4.1611
(0.7702) (1.5525) (2.6558) (1.0866)
a121 1.6878 2.3537 0.7048 1.9022
(2.0340) (2.1620) (0.5886) (0.5500)
a031 0.2167 0.1367 -0.0132 0.3807
(1.4880) (4.2020) (-0.379) (4.6016)
a131 0.3602 0.0327 0.6489 0.0411
(2.6271) (1.1268) (2.1281) (0.4364)
Table A.3: Estimated terms of trade coefficients with 0 and 1 lags, respectively.
t-statistics in parenthesis.
Open Closed
Coefficient Flexible Fixed Flexible Fixed
e21 -0.6376 -1.8401 -3.2798 -5.0486
(0.8781) (1.3178) (1.2338) (3.7827)
e23 0.1343 1.0869 -0.0122 -1.9217
(0.4862) (3.1922) (0.5081) (6.3093)
e31 -0.2127 -0.1406 -0.0009 -0.3990
(0.1455) (0.0325) (0.3273) (0.0779)
Table A.4: Estimated coefficients with the structural decomposition of stochastic
terms à la Bernanke-Sims. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Flexible Fixed
TOT GDP REER TOT GDP REER
GDP 2.387 97.564 0.050 3.583 97.755 0.662
REER 4.654 0.032 95.313 13.483 2.423 84.095
Table A.5: Variance decomposition for open economies with flexible and fixed
exchange rate regimes using Bernanke-Sims deceomposition.
Flexible Fixed
TOT GDP REER TOT GDP REER
GDP 14.023 85.787 0.190 11.238 87.712 1.050
REER 5.037 1.034 93.929 48.949 0.105 50.946
Table A.6: Variance decomposition for closed economies with flexible and fixed











Table A.7: Estimated terms of trade coefficients with 0 and 1 lags, respectively
for the complete sample -i.e. including the whole set of countries. t-statistics in
parenthesis.
Flexible Fixed
TOT GDP REER TOT GDP REER
GDP 3.086 96.000 0.914 4.141 95.076 0.782
REER 0.710 0.606 98.683 15.377 1.626 82.997
Table A.8: Variance decomposition with flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes
using using the complete sample.
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